Your browser generates a cryptographically secure 256-bit number using window.crypto — the same RNG that secures your banking app. Totally unpredictable, no patterns.
The standard behind every hardware wallet (Ledger, Trezor, MetaMask). Words from a 2048-word list encode raw entropy, which goes through 2048 rounds of PBKDF2 hashing into a seed, then BIP32 derives your key at m/44'/60'/0'/0/0. Mathematically identical odds to Random — just human-readable.
Sequential scan from private key #1 upward. Key #1 maps to a real Ethereum address that has been funded and emptied many times by researchers. The first thousands of keys are long gone — the open question is how far anyone has actually scanned. Set a custom start to skip ahead.
Key #1
Early DIY wallet scripts often used the current time as their random seed — essentially sha256(Date.now()). Every second from Ethereum's launch to today is only ~315 million timestamps, fully scannable. We test each one in order.
2015-07-30 00:00:00 UTC
Profanity was a popular tool for mining vanity Ethereum addresses like 0xdead… or 0xcafe…. In Sept 2022, 1inch found it only used 32 bits of seed for its mt19937_64 RNG — meaning only 4 billion private keys were ever generated by it. Wintermute lost $160M within hours of the disclosure. We reconstruct each key from every possible seed.
Seed 0 / 4,294,967,295
Between 2011–2015, BitcoinJS (behind millions of web wallets) filled its entropy pool using Math.random(). Chrome's Math.random() at the time ran on MWC1616, seeded with only 32 bits. Unciphered disclosed this in 2023 and estimated 1.4M BTC at risk. We replicate the MWC1616 → pool → RC4 pipeline and scan all 4 billion seeds.
Seed 0 / 4,294,967,295
The "Milk Sad" exploit (CVE-2023-39910, Aug 2023). Libbitcoin's bx seed command — featured in the book Mastering Bitcoin — seeded mt19937 with nanoseconds-since-epoch cast to a 32-bit integer. Same effective keyspace as Profanity, completely different algorithm. Exploited in the wild; over 2,600 wallets drained.
Seed 0 / 4,294,967,295
Some users reused the exact same private key across Bitcoin and Ethereum. If that key was exposed on Bitcoin — through nonce reuse, weak RNG, or published research — the ETH wallet is equally open. Load a list of known-compromised hex private keys and check their Ethereum addresses.
No list loaded.
If a wallet ever signed two transactions with the same random nonce k, both signatures share the same r value. One equation, one unknown — the private key falls out algebraically. Fetch an address's transaction history from Etherscan and check.
Enter an address and click Analyse.
If an address's transactions used nonces k with predictable high bits (weak RNG, grinding, or a known wallet bug), LLL lattice reduction can recover the private key from as few as 2–4 signatures. Paste a JSON array of [{hash, r, s}, …] below.
Paste signatures and click Run LLL.
Do you feel lucky, punk?